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Abstract Two hundred and six patients, diagnosed with
primary breast or prostate cancer completed self-report
questionnaires on two occasions: before treatment (T1) and
12 months later (T2). The questionnaires included: the
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; Impact of Events
Scale; the Metacognitions Questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30) and
the Illness Perceptions Questionnaire-revised. A series of
regression analyses indicated that metacognitive beliefs at
T1 predicted between 14 and 19 % of the variance in
symptoms of anxiety, depression and trauma at T2 after
controlling for age and gender. For all three outcomes, the
MCQ-30 subscale ‘negative beliefs about worry’ made the
largest individual contribution with ‘cognitive confidence’
also contributing in each case. For anxiety, a third meta-
cognitive variable, ‘positive beliefs about worry’ also
predicted variance in T2 symptoms. In addition, hierar-
chical analyses indicated that metacognitive beliefs
explained a small but significant amount of variance in T2
anxiety (2 %) and T2 depression (4 %) over and above that
explained by demographic variables, T1 symptoms and T1
illness perceptions. The findings suggest that modifying
metacognitive beliefs and processes has the potential to
alleviate distress associated with cancer.
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Introduction
Survival rates in cancer continue to improve. It is estimated
that there are over 10 million cancer survivors in the USA
(Institute of Medicine 2007), and around 2 million in the
UK (Maddams et al. 2009). However, despite improved
survival, cancer remains a life-threatening diagnosis which
often has a profound emotional impact years after treat-
ment has ended (Helgeson et al. 2004; Meyerowitz et al.
2008). Although emotional distress is considered a normal
response around the time of cancer diagnosis, it is also
common across the cancer trajectory with over a third of
patients in treatment or long-term follow-up reporting
clinically significant levels of distress, including anxiety
and depression, that warrants intervention (Carlson et al.
2004), while life-time prevalence of cancer-related PTSD
is 10–12 % for breast cancer and 20 % for other cancers
(Andrykowski and Kangas 2010). In recognition of this
continuing impact, health policies recommend that all
patients should undergo psychological assessment at key
point from diagnosis, and have prompt access to psycho-
logical support (Holland 1999; Institute of Medicine 2007;
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
2004).
A common and particularly influential approach to
providing such support in cancer is cognitive behaviour
therapy (CBT) (Watson et al. 2007; Williams and Dale
2006). It is based on the premise that negative illness
appraisal (i.e. negative thoughts about cancer and its con-
sequences) instigates and maintains distress. Research has
indeed begun to show that negative thoughts about cancer
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are associated with current (Cook et al. 2014; Whitaker
et al. 2008) or later distress (Llewellyn et al. 2007; Millar
et al. 2005). However, negative thoughts are common, and
especially so in people newly diagnosed with cancer, yet
not everyone becomes distressed as a result of these
thoughts. Furthermore, the focus of CBT on challenging
negative thoughts is hard to reconcile with the clinical
reality of an often uncertain future, and recent research has
indicated that many patients, especially in the early stages
of cancer treatment, find engaging with the negative con-
tent of their thoughts about cancer too difficult or dis-
tressing (Baker et al. 2012). Meta-analytic studies of CBT
and other psychotherapeutic interventions in cancer have
produced mixed results, with one recent meta-analysis
concluding that small to moderate effect sizes are typical
(Faller et al. 2013). Collectively these studies indicate that
there is considerable room for improvement in psycho-
therapeutic effectiveness.
Focusing on understanding the mechanisms underlying
the maintenance of emotional distress after cancer diag-
nosis may help to enhance the efficacy achieved by
psychological interventions (Faller et al. 2013). Possible
mechanisms of change are suggested by the metacognitive
model of emotional disorder (Wells and Mathews 1994,
1996). This model asserts that it is not the negative
content of thoughts about cancer that explains why dis-
tress is maintained but how the individual responds to
those thoughts. For most people, periods of distress in
relation to cancer, or any other stressor, are transitory.
However, the metacognitive model proposes that people
are vulnerable to persistent distress when they hold mal-
adaptive metacognitive beliefs which guide them towards
a particularly toxic style of sustained and inflexible con-
scious processing of negative thoughts and feelings about
their cancer. This is called the cognitive attentional syn-
drome (CAS), and includes cognitive processes such as
persistent worry and rumination, focussing of attention on
threat, and maladaptive coping strategies (e.g. avoidance
or thought suppression). Such processes ultimately
‘backfire’ by sustaining negative thinking and the sense of
threat rather than allowing such experiences to fade nat-
urally. According to this model, negative content of
thoughts about cancer may trigger metacognitive beliefs
and activate the CAS or may be a product of worry and
rumination, but have no direct causal role in maintaining
emotional distress. Modifying metacognitive beliefs and
interrupting the CAS has been effective in treating
depression and a range of anxiety disorders (see Wells
2009 for a review). In addition, metacognitive beliefs
have been associated with heightened emotional distress
in physical health populations including: Parkinson’s
disease (Allott et al. 2005), chronic fatigue (Maher-
Edwards et al. 2011), breast cancer (Cook et al. 2014;
Thewes et al. 2013) and prostate cancer (Cook et al.
2014).
Our previous research (Cook et al. 2014), indicated that
metacognitive beliefs (specifically ‘positive beliefs about
worry’ and ‘negative beliefs about worry’) were associated
with concurrent symptoms of anxiety, depression and
trauma among patients recently diagnosed with breast or
prostate cancer, and that they explained additional variance
in these outcomes after controlling for age, gender and
negative content of thoughts about cancer (i.e. negative
illness perceptions). Structural equation modelling found
evidence consistent with the central predictions of the
metacognitive model that these beliefs cause and maintain
distress directly, but also indirectly by driving worry.
These findings provide the first evidence consistent with
the theory that metacognitive beliefs underlie emotional
distress experienced by cancer patients. However in order
to provide more compelling evidence of a causal role for
metacognitive beliefs in maintaining emotional distress
after cancer, prospective research is needed to demonstrate
a temporal relationship. Consequently, the aim of this study
is to explore whether metacognitive beliefs measured
shortly after diagnosis (T1) predict symptoms of anxiety,
depression and trauma 12 months later (T2) and to explore
whether they add to the variance explained over and above
previously implicated variables including T1 symptoms
and content of thoughts about cancer (i.e. T1 illness per-
ceptions). Specifically we hypothesised that:
(1) Metacognitive beliefs assessed around the time of
diagnosis will prospectively predict variance in
anxiety depression and trauma 12 months later
(2) Metacognitive beliefs assessed around the time of
diagnosis will add to the variance explained in T2
anxiety, depression and trauma symptoms over and
above demographic variables, T1 symptoms and T1
illness perceptions
Methods
Design
A prospective cohort design included a pre-treatment
baseline and 12 month follow-up. The study was approved
by the NHS North West 5 Research Ethics Committee
(reference: 09/H1010/70).
Procedure
From February 2010 to May 2011, 229 patients were
consecutively recruited through two pre-treatment cancer
clinics at a National Health Service (NHS) teaching
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hospital in North-West England. Inclusion criteria were a
diagnosis of primary breast or prostate cancer and at least
18 years of age. Patients with recurrent or metastatic dis-
ease and those judged by the clinical team or researcher to
be too distressed or confused to give informed consent
were excluded. T1 data was obtained from self-report
questionnaires and medical records shortly after diagnosis
before primary treatment. Follow-up data (T2) was col-
lected 12 months later through self-report questionnaires
mailed to participants’ homes.
Measures
All Measures were Assessed Both at T1 and T2
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale [HADS,
(Zigmond and Snaith 1983)] assessed the primary out-
comes of anxiety and depression. The HADS is the most
widely used measure of anxiety and depression in physical
illness and has been extensively validated for cancer pop-
ulations (Luckett et al. 2010; Norton et al. 2013; Voder-
maier and Millman 2011). It consists of fourteen items
(seven in each subscale) scored on a 4-point scale. The
subscale scores range from 0 to 21, high scores indicating
greater anxiety or depression and scores of 8 or more
indicating clinically significant levels. In the current sam-
ple, both subscales had good internal consistency (Cron-
bach’s a:.84/.88 for T1/T2 depression; .88/.89 for T1/T2
anxiety).
Trauma symptoms were assessed using the Impact of
Events Scale [IES; (Horowitz et al. 1979)]. This 15-item
measure yields a total score of 0–75, with high scores
indicating greater trauma. It has been validated as a
screening measure of stress reactions after a range of
traumatic events (Sundin and Horowitz 2002). There is no
consensus on a cut-off score for clinically significant
trauma. However, a score of 27 or more provided an
overall correct classification rate of 80 % in a large sample
of motor vehicle accident survivors comprising both gen-
ders (Coffey et al. 2006), and has previously been used in
cancer (Purnell et al. 2011). Internal consistency of the IES
was excellent at both time points in the current sample
(Cronbach’s a: .90/.94).
The revised Illness Perceptions Questionnaire [IPQ-R
(Moss-Morris et al. 2002)] was used to assess participants’
appraisal of their cancer. It assessed thoughts, ideas and
beliefs about cancer in several distinct areas, including:
‘identity’ (the number of symptoms participants attribute to
their cancer); ‘chronic timeline’ (how long they think it
will last); ‘cyclical timeline’ (the perception that symptoms
are cyclical); ‘consequences’ (the perception that cancer
has negative consequences on life); ‘personal control’ and
‘treatment control’ (the beliefs that it can be controlled or
cured by their own actions or by treatment, respectively);
‘illness coherence’ (the extent to which they feel they
understand their illness); ‘emotional representation’ (their
emotional response to their illness); and beliefs about
causality. As the IPQ-R was included to assess the relative
importance of patients’ illness appraisal, the emotional
representation subscale was disregarded. The final section
of the IPQ-R assesses patients’ causal attributions. These
items are typically not summed as a single scale but may be
analysed as separate items or as groups devised on the basis
of theory (Moss-Morris et al. 2002). As only psychological
and/or behavioural attributions have contributed to vari-
ance in quality of life (Scharloo et al. 2010) or emotional
distress (Kulik and Kronfeld 2005; Traeger et al. 2009)
after diagnosis of cancer, the seven causal items which
reflect these attributions (i.e. ‘my own behaviour’, ‘my
mental attitude’, ‘stress or worry’, ‘my emotional state’,
and ‘my personality’ ‘family problems or worries’ and
‘overwork’) were used to generate a single causal subscale
(‘psychological attributions’) and the remaining causal
items were disregarded. With the exception of the identity
subscale (in which the items are dichotomous), all IPQ-R
items are scored 1–5 with higher subscale scores indicating
greater endorsement of that illness perception. In the cur-
rent sample, Cronbach’s a: of the IPQ-R subscales ranged
from .64 (‘personal control’) to .82 (‘chronic timeline’/
’cyclical timeline’) at time 1 and from .63 (‘treatment
control’) to .89 (‘cyclical timeline’) at time 2, indicating
relatively poor to good internal consistency.
Metacognitive beliefs were measured using the Meta-
cognitions Questionnaire 30- [MCQ-30 (Wells and Cart-
wright-Hatton 2004)]. The MCQ-30 was developed
specifically to assess key components of the metacognitive
model of emotional disorder. It comprises five subscales:
‘positive beliefs about worry’; ‘negative beliefs about
worry’; ‘cognitive confidence’; ‘need to control thoughts’;
and ‘cognitive self-consciousness’. For each, items are
scored 1–4, yielding a total score of 6–24. High scores
indicate more positive or negative beliefs about worry,
reduced confidence in memory, greater belief in the need to
control thoughts and an increased tendency towards self-
focussed attention, respectively. In the current sample,
Cronbach’s a: of MCQ-30 subscales ranged from .73
(‘need to control thoughts’) to .89 (‘positive beliefs about
worry’) at T1 and from .79 (‘need to control thoughts’) to
.91 (‘positive beliefs about worry’) at T2, indicating ade-
quate to excellent internal consistencey.
Analysis
The data were analysed using SPSS Version 20. As \2 %
of the data were missing at the scale level, and these were
confirmed to be missing completely at random, missing
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scores were imputed using the SPSS Expectation–Maxi-
misation algorithm (Little and Rubin 1987).
As not all scales were normally distributed, nonpara-
metric statistics (Mann–Whitney or Kruskal–Wallis) were
used to compare participants who completed both assess-
ments with those who only completed T1 assessment on
age group (divided above and below the median age),
gender, educational level, perceived emotional social sup-
port, stage of disease, T1 HADS and IES scores. They were
also used to examine the relationship of each T2 outcome
with demographic, clinical and social support variables.
Where significant associations with T2 outcomes were
found (p \ .05), the relevant variables were entered as
demographic control variables in the first step of sub-
sequent regression analyses.
Initially, the IPQ-R and MCQ-30 were analysed in
parallel to identify which subscales within each measure
independently predicted each T2 outcome. For the IPQ-R,
hierarchical multiple regression analyses were first used to
identify the T1 subscales associated with each T2 outcome
(anxiety, depression and trauma) after controlling for
demographic variables (Analysis 1 for each outcome).
These analyses were then repeated, using just the signifi-
cant IPQ-R subscales from Analysis 1, and also controlling
for T1 symptoms of anxiety, depression or trauma (Ana-
lysis 2 for each outcome). As we had no a priori theory
about which subscales would independently predict T2
outcomes, the IPQ-R subscales were included in each
analysis using stepwise rather than forced entry. The sub-
scales identified as independent predictors in Analysis 2 for
each outcome were then entered as variables in Analysis 3
for that outcome (see below).
This sequence of analyses was repeated for the MCQ-
30, thereby testing hypothesis 1. We first identified the T1
MCQ-30 subscales that independently predict T2 outcomes
after controlling for demographic variables (Analysis 1 for
each outcome), and then entered these in a further analysis
also controlling for T1 symptoms of anxiety, depression or
trauma (Analysis 2 for each outcome). As with the IPQ-R
analyses, as we had no a priori theory about which sub-
scales would independently predict T2 outcomes, MCQ-30
subscales were included in each analysis using stepwise
rather than forced entry. The subscales identified as inde-
pendent predictors in Analysis 2 for each outcome were
then entered as variables in Analysis 3 for that outcome
(see below), which tested hypothesis 2.
Final hierarchical multiple regression analyses (Analysis
3 for each outcome) assessed whether the T1 MCQ-30
subscales which had been identified as significant predic-
tors in Analysis 2 (see above) were able to predict variance
in T2 outcomes over and above that explained by demo-
graphic variables, T1 symptoms and the negative content of
thoughts about cancer at Time 1 (i.e. IPQ-R subscales
identified as significant predictors in Analysis 2). This final
analysis used forced entry and bootstrapped sampling to
ensure findings were robust.
Results
Completers Versus Non Completers
Of the 229 participants who completed T1 questionnaires
206 (90 %) also completed the assessment 12 months later.
No significant differences between completers and non-
completers were apparent on T1 HADS and IES scores,
age, gender, education, or tumour grade. However non-
completers were more likely than completers to report low
levels of perceived emotional support at T1 (52 vs. 31 %
p = .034).
Sample Characteristics
The baseline demographic and clinical characteristics of
the final sample (N = 206) are shown in Table 1. Women
with breast cancer and younger patients were more anxious
at T2 (U = -3,269.5, p \ .001, r = -.27; U = -3,721,
p \ .001. r = .26), and reported more trauma symptoms
(U = 3,636, p = .003, r = -.21; U = 3,638, p \ .001,
r = .27) than did men with prostate cancer or older
patients. Women with breast cancer also reported more
symptoms of depression at T2 than did men with prostate
cancer (U = 3,857.5, p = .014, r = .17). No outcome was
related to education, perceived emotional support or
tumour grade. Therefore just age and gender were used as
demographic covariates in subsequent analyses. The levels
of anxiety, depression and trauma symptoms at both time
points are shown in Table 2. Both anxiety and trauma
symptoms significantly declined over time, whereas
depressive symptoms significantly increased.
Association of T1 Illness Perceptions with T2 Anxiety,
Depression and Trauma
Regression of emotional distress on the IPQ-R subscales
(Table 3) indicated that illness perceptions predicted
between 10 % (trauma) and 12 % (anxiety) of the variance
in T2 outcomes after controlling for age and gender
(Analysis 1) and between 2 % (trauma) and 3 % (anxiety
and depression) after also controlling for T1 symptoms
(Analysis 2). The final models from Analysis 2 indicated
that, perceived lack of personal control and negative per-
ception of the consequences of cancer predicted T2 anxiety
(1 and 2 % respectively), while poor understanding of the
illness (‘illness coherence’) predicted T2 depression and
trauma. These IPQ- R subscales were therefore used to
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control for content of thoughts about cancer in the final
hierarchical multiple regression analyses.
Association of T1 Metacognitive Beliefs with T2
Anxiety, Depression and Trauma
The results of the hierarchical multiple regression analyses
to test hypothesis 1 are shown in Table 4. After controlling
for age and gender (Analysis 1), metacognitive beliefs
explained an additional 19 % of the variance in T2 anxiety,
15 % of the variance in T2 depression and 14 % of the
variance in T2 trauma. In all cases ‘negative beliefs about
worry’ made the largest individual contribution of all the
predictors with ‘cognitive confidence’ also making a sig-
nificant individual contribution. For anxiety, ‘positive
beliefs about worry’ was a further significant individual
predictor of T2 symptoms. After controlling for T1
symptoms as well as demographic variables (Analysis 2),
metacognitive beliefs continued to predict a small but
significant proportion of variance in each outcome. It added
a significant 2 % to the variance in T2 anxiety, 5 % to the
variance in T2 depression and 1 % to the variance in T2
trauma. In each case, ‘cognitive confidence’ was the only
MCQ-30 subscale that continued to make a significant
individual contribution to the variance explained, and
consequently this variable was the only metacognitive
variable entered into the final set of analyses (Analysis 3).
Predictive ability of T1 Metacognitive Beliefs Over
and Above: Demographic Variables, T1 Symptoms
and Content of Thoughts about Cancer
The results of the hierarchical multiple regression analyses
to test the second hypothesis (Analysis 3) are shown in
Table 5. For anxiety and depression, ‘cognitive confidence’
added a significant 2 and 4 % respectively to the variance
in T2 symptoms over and above demographic variables, T1
symptoms and content of thoughts about cancer (i.e. rele-
vant T1 illness perceptions). For anxiety, younger age,
baseline symptoms, perceived lack of personal control and
low cognitive confidence each made a significant individ-
ual contribution to the final model, which accounted for
42 % of the variance in T2 symptoms. For depression, just
younger age, baseline symptoms and low cognitive confi-
dence made significant independent contributions to the
final model, which accounted for 33 % of the variance in
T2 symptoms.
In the case of trauma, ‘cognitive confidence’ did not
make any significant contribution to the variance explained
in T2 symptoms after controlling for demographic vari-
ables, T1 symptoms and T1 illness perceptions (‘illness
coherence’). In fact, younger age and T1 symptoms were
the only variables to make a significant individual contri-
bution to the final model, which accounted for 39 % of the
variance.
Table 1 Sample characteristics
at time 1 (N = 206)
N.B. Missing data: marital
status n = 5; live alone n = 3;
education n = 9; employment
n = 3; tumour grade n = 3
Age
Mean (SD) 61.5
(9.0)
Range 39–85
Gender
Female 133
Male 73
Marital status
Married/co-habiting 139
Single/divorced/
widowed
62
Live alone 37
Education
None 76
School qualifications
or higher
121
Employment
Employed (full/part-
time)
79
Retired 92
Retired (health) 14
Homemaker 9
Unemployed 9
Cancer diagnosis
Breast 133
Prostate 73
Tumour grade
Low 54
Intermediate 97
High 52
Table 2 Distribution of
anxiety, depression and trauma
scores at both time-points
Time 1 Time 2 T1–T2 difference
Mean (SD) Median (IQR) Mean (SD) Median (IQR)
Anxiety 7.6 (4.4) 7.5 (4–11) 6.2 (4.5) 5 (3–9) Z = -4.6; r = -.23; p = .000
Depression 3.3 (3.3) 2 (1–5) 4.1 (3.9) 3 (1–6.6) Z = 3.1; r = .015; p = .002
Trauma 29.4 (16.9) 31 (14–42.3) 21.2 (18.9) 17 (3.3–35) Z = -6.5; r = -.32; p = .000
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Discussion
This is the first study to explore whether metacognitive
beliefs soon after cancer diagnosis, and before active
treatment (T1), predict emotional distress 12 months later
(T2). T1 metacognitive beliefs predicted T2 anxiety,
depression, and trauma after controlling for age, gender
and T1 symptoms, thus supporting hypothesis 1. This
finding builds on previous research in non-clinical popu-
lations in which metacognitive beliefs prospectively pre-
dicted levels of anxiety and depression two (Weber and
Exner 2013), three (Papageorgiou and Wells 2009;
Table 3 Final models of the variance in T2 anxiety, depression and trauma predicted by T1 illness perceptions after controlling for age and
gender (Analysis 1) and age, gender and T1 levels of symptoms (Analysis 2)
T2 anxiety T2 depression T2 trauma
R2 change Beta T p R2 change Beta T p R2 change Beta T p
Analysis 1
Constant 3.05 .003 3.13 .002 4.74 .000
Step 1–demographics 13 %*** 5 %** 14 %***
Gender -.19 -3.04 .003 -.13 -1.94 .054 -.14 -2.28 .023
Age -.21 -3.28 .001 -.11 -1.62 .106 -.27 -4.19 .000
Step 2–IPQ-R 12 %*** 11 %** 10 %***
Identity ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns
Cyclical timeline ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns
Chronic timeline ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns
Consequences .22 3.41 .001 .19 2,75 .006 .19 2.92 .004
Illness coherence ns ns ns -.18 -2.73 .007 -.24 -3.76 .000
Psychological attributions .19 2.97 .003 ns ns ns ns ns ns
Personal control -.14 -2.18 .030 -.13 -2.02 .045 ns ns ns
Treatment control ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns
R2 25 % 16 % 24 %
Adj R2 23 % 13 % 23 %
Analysis 2
Constant 2.79 .006 4.61 .000 4.23 .000
STEP 1–demographics 13 %*** 5 %** 14 %***
Gender -.03 -.42 .675 -.08 -1.36 .177 -.04 -.65 .516
Age -.17 -2.99 .003 -.15 -2.41 .017 -.22 -3.69 .000
Step 2—T1 symptoms 25 %*** 21 %*** 23 %***
T1 Anxiety .49 8.03 .000 – – – – – –
T1 depression – – – .44 7.25 .000 – – –
T1 trauma – – – – – – .46 7.40 .000
Step 2–IPQ-R## 3 %* 3 %** 2 %*
Consequences .13 2.17 .032 ns ns ns ns ns ns
Illness coherence – – – -.16 -2.65 .009 -.13 -2.23 .025
Psychological attributions ns ns ns – – – – – –
Personal control -.11 -2.08 .039 ns ns ns – – –
R2 41 % 29 % 39 %
Adj R2 39 % 27 % 37 %
R2 change shows increment in variance explained when each set of variables was entered sequentially; beta, T and p are from the final model
containing variables from all steps
N.B. IPQ-R subscales entered using stepwise method
ns non significant, data not available using stepwise methods
* p \ .05 , ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001
## Only subscales found to be significant predictors in Analysis 1 were entered. – indicates variable not included
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Hjemdal et al. 2013) and 6 months (Yilmaz et al. 2011)
later, after controlling for age, gender and T1 levels of
symptoms.
Before controlling for T1 symptoms, metacognitive
beliefs explained a greater proportion of variance in T2
anxiety, depression and trauma than did illness perceptions.
Furthermore the illness perception subscales that were
predictive (‘consequences’, ‘personal control’, ‘psycho-
logical attributions’, ‘illness coherence’) could be consid-
ered to be markers for worry or rumination in that they may
be the outcome of these processes. Of the five MCQ-30
subscales included in Analysis 1, two (‘negative beliefs
about worry’ and ‘cognitive confidence’) independently
predicted T2 anxiety, depression and trauma, with a third
(‘positive beliefs about worry’) also significantly contrib-
uting to the variance in anxiety. In all three cases ‘negative
beliefs about worry’ made the largest individual contribu-
tion, as would be predicted by the metacognitive model of
emotional disorder (Wells 2009). These findings are also
consistent with those of (Yilmaz et al. 2011) who reported
that, in their non-clinical sample, ‘negative beliefs about
worry’ predicted levels of anxiety and depression 6 months
Table 4 Final models of the variance in T2 anxiety, depression and trauma predicted by T1 metacognitive beliefs after controlling for age and
gender (Analysis 1) and age, gender and T1 levels of symptoms (Analysis 2)
T2 anxiety T2 depression T2 trauma
R2 change Beta T p R2 change Beta T p R2 change Beta T p
Analysis 1
Constant 2.98 .003 1.19 .236 3.64 .000
Step 1–demographics 13 %*** 5 %** 14 %***
Gender -.16 -2.67 .008 -.10 -1.60 .112 -.11 -1.70 .091
Age -20 -3.39 .001 -.10 -1.62 .107 -.26 -4.24 .000
Step 2–MCQ-30 19 %** 15 %*** 14 %***
POS .17 2.58 .011 ns ns ns ns ns ns
NEG .28 3.90 .000 .25 3.64 .000 .28 4.31 .000
CC .12 2.00 .047 .22 3.34 .001 .17 2.66 .008
NC ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns
CSC ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns
R2 32 % 20 % 27 %
Adj R2 30 % 18 % 26 %
Analysis 2
Constant 3.70 .000 2.34 .020 3.19 .002
Step 1–demographics 13 %*** 5 %** 14 %***
Gender -.03 -.54 .590 -.09 -1.42 .158 -.04 -.62 .537
Age -.20 -3.62 .000 -.13 -2.18 .030 -.21 -3.51 .001
Step 2—T1 symptoms 25 %*** 21 %*** 23 %***
T1 anxiety .50 8.22 .000 – – – – – –
T1 depression – – – .42 7.06 .000 – – –
T1 trauma – – – – – – .47 7.44 .000
Step 3—MCQ-30## 2 %* 5 %*** 1 %*
POS ns ns ns – – – – – –
NEG ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns
CC .14 2.53 .012 .23 3.85 .000 .13 2.16 .032
R2 40 % 31 % 38 %
Adj R2 39 % 30 % 36 %
R2 change shows increment in variance explained when each set of variables was entered sequentially; beta, T and p are from the final model
containing variables from all steps
N.B. MCQ-30 subscales entered using stepwise method. MCQ-30 subscales: positive beliefs about worry (POS); negative beliefs about the
danger and uncontrollability of worry (NEG); cognitive confidence (CC); need for control (NC); cognitive self-consciousness (CSC)
ns non significant, data not available using stepwise methods
* p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001
## Only subscales found to be significant predictors in Analysis 1 were entered. – indicates variable not included
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later. However, in the current study when T1 levels of
distress were controlled, the relationship of ‘negative
beliefs about worry’ with anxiety and depression was no
longer significant. Instead ‘cognitive confidence’ was the
only metacognitive variable to contribute to variance. The
reasons for this are not clear.
One possibility is that this finding is due to the limita-
tions of using hierarchical regression in a prospective study
design where baseline emotional distress inevitably pre-
dominates in predicting future distress. Previous research
(Cook et al. 2014) has demonstrated a strong cross-sec-
tional association of T1 symptoms of anxiety, depression
and trauma with metacognitive beliefs and processes.
Consequently, as the metacognitive beliefs and processes
that we measured to predict T2 distress also (according to
theory) cause T1 distress, there is likely to be considerable
overlap in the variance in T2 distress explained by T1
symptoms and metacognitive beliefs, leading to underes-
timation of the importance of the putative causal variables.
That is, by controlling for baseline symptoms we may be
masking the effect of the beliefs and processes that underlie
its maintenance. To resolve this dilemma, approaches to
analysis are required that can distinguish putatively causal
effects arising from metacognitive beliefs and processes
(causing symptoms of distress to be maintained) from the
confounding effect resulting from symptom maintenance.
Such differentiation is not feasible using standard hierar-
chical regression but may be possible using structural
equation modelling techniques to model the effect of
change in metacognitive beliefs on change in emotional
distress.
As well as being able to explain more of the variance in
T2 distress than did illness perceptions in Analysis 1,
metacognitive beliefs (‘cognitive confidence’) were also
able to explain additional variance in anxiety and depres-
sion over and above age, gender, T1 symptoms, and T1
illness perceptions (Analysis 3). This supports hypothesis 2
for these two outcomes. However, for trauma, metacogni-
tive beliefs (‘cognitive confidence’) no longer significantly
predicted T2 symptoms after including T1 illness percep-
tions (‘illness coherence’) in the analysis (Analysis 3).
However, it should be noted that the proportion of variance
in T2 trauma explained by ‘cognitive confidence’ is
unchanged between Analysis 2 (controlling for T1 trauma)
and Analysis 3 (controlling for T1 trauma and T1 ‘illness
coherence’). Furthermore, there is little difference in the
Table 5 Final models of the variance in T2 anxiety, depression and trauma predicted by T1 metacognitive beliefs after controlling for age,
gender, T1 level of symptoms and T1 illness perceptions (Analysis 3)
T2 anxiety T2 depression T2 trauma
R2 change Beta T p R2 change Beta T p R2 change Beta T p
Analysis 3
Constant 2.50 .013 2.98 .003 3.66 .000
Step 1–demographics 13 %*** 5 %** 14 %***
Gender -.04 -.63 .527 -.09 -1.50 .136 -.05 -.79 .430
Age -.18 -3.06 .003 -.14 -2.29 .023 -.22 -3.73
Step 2—T1 symptoms 25 %*** 21 %*** 23 %***
T1 anxiety .46 7.49 .000 – – – – – –
T1 Depression – – – .41 6.86 .000 – – –
T1 trauma – – – – – – .44 6.77 .000
Step 3—IPQ-R## 3 %** 3 %** 2 %*
Consequences .12 1.94 .054 – – – – – –
Illness coherence – – – -.11 -1.83 .068 -.11 -1.90 .058
Personal control -.11 -2.09 .038 – – – – – –
Step 4—MCQ-30## 2 %* 4 %** 1 %ns
CC .13 2.32 .02 .20 3.31 .001 .11 1.78 .076
Model summary
R2 42 % 33 % 39 %
Adj R2 41 % 31 % 37 %
R2 change shows increment in variance explained by each step; beta, T and p are from the final model containing variables from all steps
N.B. All variables entered using forced entry method. MCQ-30 subscales: cognitive confidence (CC)
## Only subscales found to be significant predictors in Analysis 2 were entered. – indicates variable not included
* p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001
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variance explained by ‘cognitive confidence’ in trauma
(1 %) and in anxiety (2 %). Therefore this apparent dis-
crepancy may be an artefact of the present data. To our
knowledge this is the first study to explore the prospective
relationship between metacognitive beliefs (as measured
by the MCQ-30) and trauma symptoms, making it difficult
to judge the reliability of this finding.
One limitation of the study is the restriction of the
sample to breast and prostate cancer patients. These pop-
ulations were selected because they represent the largest
tumour groups in each gender and have a broadly similar
prognosis. However this means it is not possible, in this
sample, to separate out any effects that may be due to
tumour group or gender. Furthermore, we cannot assume
that the predictive effects found in this study would gen-
eralise to other cancer populations. Further studies will be
needed to test the stability of the observed predictive effect
of metacognitive beliefs on persistent emotional distress
across genders and different tumour and prognostic groups.
In addition, despite the prospective design, it should be
noted that causality can still not be assumed as the influ-
ence of unmeasured confounders cannot be ruled out. In
order to provide more compelling evidence of a causal role
for metacognitive beliefs, further studies are necessary that
adopt different approaches to design, such as experimental
manipulation.
In summary, the findings of the current study provide
promising first evidence that metacognitive beliefs can help
to predict anxiety, depression and trauma 1 year after
diagnosis of breast and prostate cancer. Furthermore they
support the hypothesis that metacognitive beliefs add to the
variance explained in persistent anxiety and depression
over and above that explained by negative content of
thoughts about cancer. Consequently, therapeutic approa-
ches targeting metacognitive beliefs and processes, rather
than the content of negative thoughts about cancer, may
prove beneficial for preventing persistent emotional dis-
tress in these populations.
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